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Abstract 
Models of shrouding predict that firms lack incentives to compete on add-on prices. 
Working with a large Turkish bank to test SMS direct marketing promotions to 
108,000 existing checking account holders, we find that messages promoting a large 
discount on the overdraft interest rate reduce overdraft usage. In contrast, messages 
that mention overdraft availability without mentioning price increase usage. Neither 
change persists long after messages stop, suggesting that induced overdrafting is not 
habit-forming. Our results are consistent with a model of limited memory and 
attention. 
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1. Introduction 
Theorists, empiricists and policymakers are scrutinizing add-on prices, such as penalty fees 
on financial products, as potentially deceptive and inefficient. Yet empirical evidence is 
lacking on key questions posed by the theoretical literature, such as whether firms have 
incentives to shroud add-on prices (Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Heidhues, Koszegi, and 
Murooka 2014), and whether and which aspects of add-ons are salient for consumers 
(Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2014). 
We provide empirical evidence on these questions from a direct marketing field experiment 
on checking account overdrafts, a prevalent and economically important add-on that has 
helped motivate much of the recent theoretical work and triggered several recent regulatory 
actions in the US and the EU. An overdraft occurs if the checking account holder initiates a 
transaction that makes her balance negative, or more negative. Checking accounts in much of 
the world moved to a “free if nonnegative balance, very expensive if in overdraft” 
equilibrium during the 1990s, with overdraft revenue from fees and interest charges replacing 
monthly subscription fees as the major source of explicit income from checking accounts. In 
the US, banks collected $32 billion in overdraft revenue in 2013 (source: Moebs). In the UK, 
banks derive almost as much income from overdrafts as from re-investing checking account 
deposits (Competition and Markets Authority 2014). In Turkey, the site of our field 
experiment, the post-experiment (June 2013) announcement of a binding price ceiling on 
overdrafts was immediately followed by a 1.4% reduction in bank share prices, with a 2.1% 
drop for the most overdraft-reliant bank.  
Descriptive evidence suggests that the bank overdraft market is a prime example of shrouded 
equilibrium where firms lack incentives to draw attention to, or compete on, add-on prices. 
Despite the economic importance of overdrafts, banks rarely market these services, at least at 
the customer acquisition stage (General Accounting Office 2008; Competition and Markets 
Authority 2014).2 Banks moreover blur the line between positive and negative balances for 
consumers by reporting an available-to-withdraw figure that adds the available credit amount 
to the checking account balance, and by making information on disaggregated balances and 
finance charges more difficult to find than the aggregate available balance. On the consumer 
side, overdrafts happen passively in the sense that they are triggered in the course of 
2 Casual empiricism suggests that some banks are now starting to market low-cost or no-overdraft 
products in the U.S., perhaps in response to recent regulations and ongoing regulatory pressure (see 
Section 2.5). 
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checking account usage rather than by separate transactions where a consumer explicitly 
draws from a line of credit. Some descriptive data are consistent with consumers 
underestimating overdraft likelihood and costs (Armstrong and Vickers 2012; Stango and 
Zinman 2014) and experiencing “bill shock” (Grubb 2015).  
Nevertheless there are reasons to doubt the descriptive power of shrouding models. Stango 
and Zinman (2014) finds that low balances (<$100) are common but not typically followed 
by overdrafts in a US sample, and that many checking account holders report a willingness to 
pay a market price (e.g., a $25-$30 fee) to settle even a small-dollar overdraft. The bulk of 
overdraft costs are paid by a small number of checking account holders who overdraft 
repeatedly (Bakker et al. 2014; Financial Conduct Authority 2014), raising the broader 
question of whether experience unshrouds or at least bounds the distortions or duration of a 
shrouded equilibrium.3 Indeed, Heidhues et al (2014) notes that the profitability of high add-
on prices is “limited by consumers’ ex-post demand response to add-on prices” (p. 11), 
raising the possibility that, at the customer level, the firm wants to shroud at the acquisition 
stage but then unshroud while cutting the price of the add-on. Practices in our setting seem 
consistent with some degree of unshrouding, as we discuss below. 
In short, empirical evidence on what drives overdraft pricing, advertising, and usage is mixed 
and largely descriptive. More broadly, empirical work on contingent and possibly-deceptive 
pricing is in its early stages.  
Yapi Kredi (YK), one of the largest banks in Turkey, sought to learn more about the overdraft 
market and its optimal strategy for pricing and marketing the product. In particular, YK was 
interested in understanding whether pricing and advertising content tactics it had tried in the 
past work to increase demand, and if not why not. YK’s interest rate (60% APR) and product 
design was in line with standard practices and regulations. We worked with YK to design 
field experiments to distinguish between neoclassical and shrouding models, and YK 
implemented the experiments by randomly varying the messaging and pricing (promotional 
offers) it sent, via SMS, to 108,000 existing checking account clients. 
3 Gabaix and Laibson (2006, Section III.A) speculates that learning causes shrouding to disappear, 
eventually, despite potential countervailing dynamic forces. 
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Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design. The design produces random variation, across 
clients and over time, in prices and in messaging content, frequency, and duration.4 The 
primary pricing test was a rebate of half of the interest accrued on overdrafts, with other 
messages promoting overdraft availability without mentioning price. The bank also tested 
price promotions for bill payment by automatic-debit and debit card usage. We track data on 
overdraft usage, as well as on bill payment auto-debit and debit card usage. The mechanics 
here include both direct and indirect effects: messaging and pricing changes for each of the 
three services could directly alter the usage of that service, and usage of a service may in turn 
alter usage of the others (specifically, using an automatic bill payment or debit card may 
subsequently lead one to overdraft their checking account). 
We find that messages offering a 50% discount on the overdraft interest rate reduce overdraft 
usage by about 2%, relative to messages that do not offer the discount. This is a striking 
finding: offering a price reduction on a commodity reduces demand for that commodity.5 It is 
all the more striking given our sample of existing customers; as noted above, firms probably 
have lesser incentives to shroud at this post-acquisition stage than at the customer acquisition 
stage. Note that not all price promotions backfire; rather, we find evidence that the discounts 
we tested on non-overdraft services—debit cards and auto-debit for bill payments—increase 
demand for those services.6  
Why does the overdraft interest discount backfire? The overdraft discount messages must 
change something else in the consumer’s mind besides price: we do not think that the demand 
curve for overdrafts is actually upward-sloping. We find some clues in theory—particularly 
in Bordalo et al’s model (2014) of how limited memory and limited attention interact to drive 
consumer choice when facing new or forgotten information—and in some additional results 
from our experiment. It may be that some consumers typically ignore overdraft charges when 
using their checking account, behaving as if the cost is zero. The overdraft interest discount 
promotion brings costs to mind, and makes people realize that the cost is strictly greater than 
4 The bank also sent half of the sample a message on August 30th that was identical to the September 
15th Overdraft Availability Reminder message. This randomization was independent with respect to 
the September 15th treatment assignments. We discuss this message in Sections 3.1, 4.1, and 4.6. 
5 Our finding is reminiscent of the Hsee (1998) finding explained in Bordalo et al (2014). In isolation, 
people have higher willingness to pay for a dinner set with 24 plates than for one with >24 intact 
plates but a few broken ones. But in a pairwise choice people prefer the set with >24 intact plates. 
Having said that, we do not actually offer consumers in our sample a pairwise choice between more-
expensive and less-expensive overdrafts. 
6 We also find some evidence that a one-shot message about the Overdraft Interest Discount actually 
increases demand. 
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zero, depressing usage.7 Additional evidence, that demand decreases in the intensity of 
messaging about the interest discount, is consistent with this hypothesized behavioral 
mechanism. So is evidence that the most demand-depressing messaging treatments are ones 
that offer bundled discounts—on overdrafts plus either debit card usage or auto-debit 
enrollment— repeatedly.8 This suggests that bundling creates associations between checking 
account usage and the likelihood of incurring overdraft costs.9 
Meanwhile, the overdraft availability reminder message that mentions the overdraft service, 
but says nothing about its cost, increases overdraft usage relative to messages that do not 
mention overdraft at all (and relative to overdraft cost-mentioning messages), by about 4%. 
Also in contrast to the overdraft discount messages, sending more overdraft availability 
reminders increases demand. These findings are consistent with the overdraft feature—and 
not just its cost—being far from top of mind: reminding someone that it is there for “cash 
needs” increases use of the add-on feature.  
What do our results imply for shrouding models? First, they support the key prediction of 
these models. The demand-depressing effect of overdraft interest discount messages suggests 
that firms have incentives to shroud add-on prices because drawing attention to a contingent 
charge—unshrouding it—reduces profits earned from that charge. Second, the perverse effect 
of the overdraft interest discount messaging, and the demand increase from overdraft 
availability reminders, support the models’ motivating assumption of consumer confusion 
and/or inattention at baseline. As Bordalo et al (2014) states, “… salience plays a role only 
when attribute realizations differ from expectations and thus draw attention. If the consumers 
had correct expectations, there would be no surprise.” Third, our results at least partially 
support the shrouding models’ key assumption that consumers are not merely confused in a 
7 More generally, it may be the case that the discount causes consumers to revise their cost estimate 
upward, perhaps inferring that if the bank is offering a 50% discount, the interest rate must be high. 
Bordalo et al (2014) show that a cost reminder can have a demand-depressing effect if the reminder’s 
cost realization is sufficiently surprising. In our setting, this implies that demand can fall if marginal 
clients underestimated overdraft charges at baseline, and the Overdraft Interest Discount messaging 
caused them to increase their estimate of the overdraft interest rate by enough. 
8 These bundled messages are also longer than the single-discount messages, but if longer messages 
tax limited attention we would expect them to push treatment effects on overdrafting toward zero 
instead of further depressing demand. The idea is that getting a too-long message is akin to getting no 
message at all, since the recipient ignores the too-long message. JZ is still trying to convince his wife 
of this phenomenon. 
9 Stango and Zinman (2014) also finds evidence of associative attention shocks: survey questions 
about spending control, monitoring account balances, or other bank fees reduce overdrafting, while 
survey questions that are plausibly unrelated to overdrafting—about auto loans, gift cards, or 
contactless cards—have no effects. 
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mean-zero error sense, but rather tend to underestimate add-on charges.10 The demand-
depressing effects of the overdraft interest discount messages are certainly consistent with 
this assumption. The demand-increasing effects of the overdraft availability reminders are 
less evidently consistent with this assumption. But they could still be consistent with the 
assumption if the overdraft availability reminders work by distracting consumers from 
overdraft costs, perhaps by drawing their focus to a different attribute like availability or 
quantity (credit line). Bordalo et al (2014) formalizes this sort of salience-driven 
“overreaction”. 
Indeed, the demand-inducing effect of the overdraft availability messages does not persist 
long after the messaging stops, which is consistent with consumers correcting an 
overreaction. Of course it is also consistent with forgetting the true cost and/or quality of 
overdrafts. Similarly, the demand-depressing effect does not persist beyond the treatment 
period.  
In both cases, and regardless of the underlying cognitive mechanics, the lack of habit 
formation among marginal overdrafters is noteworthy, as policymakers have asserted that 
overdrafting is habit-forming (Financial Conduct Authority 2014). Our treatments induced 
some consumers to overdraft more, and some to overdraft less, but we find little evidence that 
these behavior changes persisted for more than a few weeks after the treatments stopped.  
Welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, in part because we do not actually have 
the ability to sharply test existing models of shrouded equilibria given that our experiment 
considers the existing client base of a single firm rather than competition for customers across 
firms (Armstrong and Vickers 2012; Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Grubb 2015; Heidhues, 
Koszegi, and Murooka 2014). But we note that our findings do not bode well for third-party 
efforts—by regulators, personal financial management app providers, etc.—to reduce 
contingent fee payments by “debiasing” consumers. Our results suggest that add-on 
suppliers—in this case banks—have incentives to keep contingent charges shrouded, even 
10 Behavioral industrial organization models make a variety of different assumptions about the cause 
of incorrect expectations about future consumption; see Spiegler (2011) for a review. In terms of the 
most closely related models to our setup, three of them assume that consumers ignore the add-on 
price. This leads to underestimation of the price and overconsumption of the add-on when the price of 
the add-on is greater than 0 (Armstrong and Vickers 2012; Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Heidhues, 
Koszegi, and Murooka 2014). In Grubb (2015), consumers underestimate their cost of attention to 
past usage (checking account balance in our case), assuming that the cost will always be zero, while in 
fact there are times when it will be strictly positive. Inattention to past usage leads consumers to pay 
more penalty fees than they anticipated ex-ante. 
5 
 
                                                          
after acquiring a customer. They also suggest that sustained messaging is required to change 
consumer behavior, and that third-parties are likely to encounter counter-messaging from 
add-on suppliers that could well increase consumer demand. We are sympathetic to Heidhues 
et al’s conjecture (p. 40) that third-parties will be outgunned in a messaging arms race with 
add-on suppliers. 
Our treatments are standard in the sense that banks everywhere communicate frequently with 
their customers—indeed this is why we do not have a no-message control group, and instead 
compare across different types of messages. Turkish banks, including our implementing 
partner, frequently offer promotional discounts and rebates on various bank account services. 
The overdraft product seems representative in the sense that it is priced expensively relative 
to seemingly close substitutes (like credit cards in Turkey), and disproportionally to credit 
risk (as found recently by Turkish regulators and courts). Our sample is probably 
representative of a substantial population of marginal overdrafters in Turkey, and shares key 
characteristics with “banked” populations in both more- and less-developed countries.  
Besides the theoretical literature on contingent and possibly deceptive pricing, our paper 
informs several other literatures on limited attention, salience, and advertising. We provide 
some evidence on what comes to mind and what does not (e.g., Bordalo, Gennaioli, and 
Shleifer 2013; Eliaz and Spiegler 2011; Hanna, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein 2014; 
Karlan et al. forthcoming). Our results suggest that price promotions have attention effects 
that can be perverse from the promoter’s perspective, thereby adding evidence to the 
literature on the psychology of incentives (Kamenica 2012). Our results are consistent with 
results from other domains suggesting that consumers respond differently to base prices vs. 
add-on prices (Anagol and Kim 2012; Brown, Hossain, and Morgan 2010; Chetty, Looney, 
and Kroft 2009).11 Relatedly, our findings contrast with those in Ferman (2014) and Elizondo 
and Seira (2014), both of which find little impact of messaging that makes the base price 
(contract APR) of high-interest credit cards more prominent in Brazil and Mexico. Our 
results are broadly consistent with prior work finding that advertising content can have 
important and surprising effects on decisions about expensive debt (Bertrand et al. 2010), and 
that messaging from banks can change the behavior of existing customers (Cadena and 
Schoar 2011; Kast, Meier, and Pomeranz 2014; Karlan, Morten, and Zinman 2014). Our 
11 We do not actually observe price sensitivity to the base price in our setting. But given our result that 
cutting overdraft prices depresses overdraft demand, we can infer differential price sensitivity merely 
by assuming that cutting the base price would not decrease demand for checking accounts. 
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results on the long-run effects of short-run messaging complement the literature on the 
dynamics of learning and/or attention regarding add-on charges (Agarwal et al. 2013; Ater 
and Landsman 2013; Haselhuhn et al. 2012; Stango and Zinman 2014), and suggest that 
short-run behavior changes do not induce learning or greater sophistication about attention 
among marginal consumers (Schwartzstein 2014).12 
The most closely related empirical paper to ours is probably Stango and Zinman (2014). 
Using quasi-experimental variation in survey content in a market research panel in the U.S., 
Stango and Zinman (2014) identifies effects and dynamics of attention to overdraft fees. 
Similar to here, they find that an attention shock—a survey in their case, a promotional 
message in ours—mentioning overdraft costs reduces overdraft usage, and that repeated 
attention shocks cumulate to some extent, although they depreciate more quickly in our 
setting. Aside from the obvious differences between the two study designs— market research 
surveys versus bank advertising as attention shocks, quasi-random versus random variation, 
US versus Turkey—there are at least two other key differences. First, we have randomly 
assigned price variation. Second, our treatments include some messages that mention the 
overdraft service but not its cost. These differences lead to the surprising new inferences that 
bringing overdrafts to mind increases demand, but bringing the price of overdrafts to mind, 
even if accompanied by a discount, lowers demand. 
2. Bank Overdrafts: Markets and Policies 
2.1 Overdraft Terms and Underwriting   
The focus of our experiment is a checking account overdraft product with a structure and 
terms that are common throughout the world. The product is an unsecured line of credit that 
allows qualifying customers to overdraw their account (i.e., to hold a negative balance). The 
bank approved about 55% of checking account customers for an overdraft credit line during 
our sample period, with an amount that varies with income and credit characteristics. During 
our sample period YK offered overdraft credit lines on an opt-out basis. Customers with a 
credit line can tap it at their discretion by initiating a debit transaction that exceeds the 
available balance in the checking account. The line is automatically tapped by such debits 
and negative balances begin to accrue interest immediately. During our sample period YK 
12 See also Manoli and Turner (2014) on the rapid depreciation of information effects re: the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. 
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charged a typical APR for Turkey, in the range of 60%, or about 50% real after adjusting for 
inflation.13  
Credit limits are generally lower than those offered on credit cards or unsecured loans, and 
interest rates are typically substantially higher than on credit cards. By law, any inflow to the 
checking account is automatically allocated first toward paying off overdraft credit. If inflows 
are not sufficient to clear the balance by the end of the statement date (four weeks), the client 
receives a bill and she is given a grace period of around two weeks to pay at least the accrued 
interest. If she fails to make the required payment after 60 days the bank freezes the overdraft 
line. 
2.2 Turkish Retail Banking, the Overdraft Market, and Marketing 
Turkey’s retail/consumer banking industry is concentrated. Only about 30 banks are licensed 
to take deposits, and the largest five banks have greater than 50% market share.14 The largest 
retail banks tend to be for-profit and based in Turkey, like our partner bank Yapi Kredi (YK). 
YK is in the top five based on either total assets or the number of branches. In recent years 
the Turkish market has become known for innovation in retail banking, with one large bank 
rolling out the largest biometric ATM network in Europe, the Middle East, or Africa, and 
another large bank becoming the first bank in the world to make money transfers possible on 
Facebook. Turks have the highest rate of mobile banking in Europe among Internet users, at 
around 50%, according to a 2013 ING survey. 
As in many other countries, overdraft services are an important profit source for banks. After 
the Turkish Central Bank halved the interest rate allowed on overdrafts at the end of May 
2013 (see Section 2.5 below), bank share prices fell 1.4%, with that of the most overdraft-
reliant bank falling by 2.1%.15 
Nevertheless overdraft services are rarely featured in marketing to potential customers; e.g., 
we are not aware of any mass marketing campaigns during our sample period in Turkey or 
13 Most U.S. and U.K. banks in recent years have charged fees, in the range of $25-$40 per 
overdrafting transaction, instead of or in addition to an interest rate on outstanding balances. But there 
is some anecdotal evidence that the U.S. and U.K. are moving more toward the Turkish/Continental 
model of a more traditional line of credit, in concert with regulatory pressure (FCA 2014 Section 3.8; 
our Section 2.5 below).  
14 As of September 2012 top branch bank had 1,510 branches, and the fifth largest bank had 949, out 
of 10,241 total. Of this total the top five owned 5,663 branches (source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_banks_in_Turkey , accessed 10/22/2014). 
15 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/27/markets-turkey-idUSL5N0E81DG20130527 . 
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elsewhere. Direct marketing overdrafts to existing customers is common however; YK is a 
case in point in the sense that it came to us for guidance about how to measure and improve 
the effectiveness of direct-messaging and price promotion campaigns it had conducted in the 
recent past.  
2.3 Overdraft Users and Usage 
Who overdrafts? In Turkey there is not much data on the characteristics of overdrafters (e.g., 
our data lack information on education or income), but there are some clues. Over half of 
Turkey’s population is unbanked, according to a 2012 World Bank report. Beyond that many 
checking account holders are not approved for overdraft lines of credit due to credit risk that 
banks cannot price. These facts suggest that overdrafters are drawn from the upper half or 
third of the income distribution in Turkey, if not from the uppermost percentiles, who 
presumably have the wealth and access to cheaper credit that would tend to render 
overdrafting unlikely and/or relatively unattractive. 
Our sample overdrafts frequently in the 10 months after our experiment started, despite 
having been selected for the experiment based on infrequent overdraft activity prior to the 
experiment (Section 3.2). 45.8% of our sample overdrafts at least once between September 1, 
2012-June 30, 2013, and in any given month 15-24% of our sample overdrafts. The mean 
amount of finance charges paid over the ten months is 30.82 TL (1 TL = $0.56 USD during 
our sample period), with 75th and 95th percentiles of [] and 228.08 TL.  
2.4 Are Bank Overdraft Services Deceptive? 
As noted at the outset, much of the recent theory on potentially deceptive add-on pricing has 
been motivated by descriptive evidence on overdraft supply and demand. US and UK 
government reports have concluded that banks shroud overdraft prices and practices, both in 
upfront marketing and downstream communications with checking account customers 
(General Accounting Office 2008; Competition and Markets Authority 2014). Anecdotally it 
seems that Turkish banks do more marketing post-customer acquisition, although during our 
sample period at least there is other descriptive evidence suggesting that this produced only 
partial unshrouding. For example, it seems that customers lacked ready access to information 
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on their own overdraft usage and charges.16 Perhaps relatedly, Turkish authorities have found 
that banks benefit from substantial markups over risk-based prices (Section 2.5).  
On the demand side, descriptive evidence from the US and UK suggests that many 
consumers underestimate their overdraft usage and/or costs conditional on usage. For 
example, Stango and Zinman (2014) finds that 60% of survey respondents report overdrafting 
when they “thought there was enough money in my account”, and 24% of checking account 
holders report not knowing or remembering whether their bank described different overdraft 
coverage options at account opening (e.g., linking to a credit card or savings account for 
much lower-cost “overdraft protection”). Stango and Zinman (2009) finds that over 50% of 
overdrafts are avoidable in the sense that the account holder has ample available credit on a 
credit card that would cost a small fraction of a typical overdraft fee. In the UK, the Financial 
Conduct Authority recently summarized years of market research by concluding that 
“consumers pay little attention to overdrafts when choosing a bank account”, and “there is 
widespread confusion… for example, many wrongly thought that overdrafts were simple or 
free…” (Financial Conduct Authority 2014). 
Nevertheless, as discussed at the outset, there are reasons to doubt the descriptive power of 
theoretical models of deceptive contingent pricing. Stango and Zinman (2014) finds that low 
balances (<$100) are very common—occurring in 83% of account-months of those who 
overdraft at least once over a period averaging 15 months—but not typically followed by 
overdrafts. Moreover many U.S. survey respondents report a willingness to pay a market 
price (e.g., a $35 fee) to settle even a small-dollar overdraft. The bulk of overdraft costs in the 
U.S. and U.K. are paid by a small number of checking account holders who overdraft 
repeatedly (Bakker et al. 2014; Financial Conduct Authority 2014), raising the broader 
question of whether experience unshrouds or at least bounds the distortions or duration of a 
shrouded equilibrium. In Turkey, the active direct marketing of overdraft discounts and 
services to existing customer bases is consistent with at least partial unshrouding. 
  
16E.g. banks typically presented customers with an available balance that was the sum of their 
checking account balance and available overdraft credit, meaning that a customer would need to know 
and remember, or search for, the amount of their overdraft credit line to infer their checking account 
balance. Similarly, information on the overdraft interest rate, and the amount paid, was not 
prominently featured in online/mobile banking or in account statements. 
10 
 
                                                          
2.5 Policy Issues and Recent Actions 
Overdraft pricing has been attracting legal scrutiny around the globe. As noted above, the 
Turkish Central Bank imposed a binding price ceiling on overdraft APR in May 2013. In July 
2013 the Turkish Competition Authority fined 12 banks for price-fixing on loans, including 
overdrafts. In the U.S., the Fed began requiring banks to secure consumer opt-in for 
overdrafts on debit card and ATM transactions in 2010, and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s scrutiny of overdraft practices has led to speculation that more 
restrictions are in the offing (Dougherty 2014).17 In the U.K., regulators have secured 
voluntary measures from banks regarding pricing, enrollment, and communications, and the 
Financial Conduct Authority recently announced that it will “start to consider making some 
voluntary measures mandatory in Autumn 2014”.18 The European Parliament issued a 
Directive on Payment Accounts in April 2014 (effective Autumn 2014) that promotes 
transparency and comparison shopping by requiring “a standard form fee information 
document detailing the fees for the most representative services linked to the account such as 
withdrawals and overdrafts”.19 
3. Experimental Design, Sample and Data 
3.1 Experimental Design and Implementation 
Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and details the script of each message variant. 
The field experiment randomly assigns message content, frequency, and duration, as well as 
promotional offers on overdraft, debit card, and automated debit (for bill payment), to a 
sample of 108,000 checking account holders (we describe the sample in Section 3.2). YK did 
not send this sample any other promotional communications during this campaign. The only 
other communications YK sent to this sample were monthly account statements.  
The bank (which is described in Section 2) sent the messages by SMS, which is the most 
common way banks communicate with their clients in Turkey (91% of Turkish adults have a 
cell phone, for one of the highest penetration rates in the world). As noted above, it is also 
17 Also, the FDIC has issued supervisory guidances in the past few years that warn banks about risks 
of “excessive use” of overdrafts by customers and “maximizing fees” by banks. 
18 http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/firm-types/consumer-credit/consumer-credit-research/overdrafts , 
accessed January 14, 2015. 
19 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-300_fr.htm?locale=fr , accessed January 14, 2015. 
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common for clients to use their phone to access banking services; e.g., Turkey has the highest 
ratio of mobile banking users to Internet users in Europe. 
YK began the experiment by sending half of the sample an “overdraft availability reminder” 
message on August 30, 2012 that mentions the overdraft service and credit line but nothing 
about its cost.20 This first randomization is not crucial for testing our main hypotheses; it 
served primarily as a pilot for the subsequent randomizations and also allows us to test for a 
heterogeneous treatment effect suggested by some of the motivating theoretical models 
(Section 4.6). 
YK continued the experiment on September 15, 2012 by sending each person in the sample 
one of six randomly assigned messages: (1) 50% (n=53,953) received an “overdraft interest 
discount” message;21 (2) Among the 53,953 clients sent the overdraft interest discount, one 
third (n=17,981) also received information about an auto-debit discount22 in the message, 
one-third (n=17,995) also received information about a debit card discount23 in the message, 
and one-third (n=17,997) received no further information beyond the overdraft interest 
discount; (3) among the 54,047 clients not sent one of the above overdraft interest discount 
messages, one-third (n=18,021) received information about the auto-debit discount only,24 
one-third (n=17,983) received information about the debit card discount only,25 and one-third 
(n=18,043) received the overdraft availability reminder message described above.26  
20 “We remind you that, for your immediate cash needs, you have a Flexible Account at Yapi Kredi 
with [custom fill]TL limit. Have a nice day.”  We refer to this message as a “reminder” because the 
bank’s policy and Turkish law require upfront disclosure of the overdraft features and pricing. 
However, given that the service is offered on an opt-out basis, and that our motivating questions 
concern shrouding, we allow for the possibility that this message provides new information rather 
than being a simple reminder. We explore this in Section 4.6. 
21 “Use your Yapi Kredi Flexible Account and we will give you back half of your Flexible Account’s 
accrued interest between now and [November/December] 15…” 
22 “Authorize automatic bill payments from your account before [November/December] 15, receive 
up to a maximum of 30TL WP, and we will give you back half of your Flexible Account’s accrued 
interest between now and [November/December] 15 as WP.” Note that “WP” refers to reward points, 
which are easily redeemable at point-of-sale using the account’s debit card; anecdotally, most of the 
bank’s customers view them as equivalent to cash. 
23 “Use your Yapi Kredi debit card and earn 5% of your shopping, up to 25TL WP, and we will give 
you back half of your Flexible Account’s accrued interest between now and [November/December] 
15 as WP.” 
24 “Authorize automatic bill payments from your account before [November/December] 15, receive 
up to a maximum of 30TL WP.” 
25 “Use your Yapi Kredi debit card and earn 5% of your shopping, up to 25TL WP, between now and 
[November/December] 15 as WP.” 
26 “We remind you that, for your immediate cash needs, you have a Flexible Account at Yapi Kredi 
with [customfill] TL limit…” 
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A frequency randomization determined whether YK repeated the September 15 message 
frequently (every 10 days), less-frequently (every 20 days), or not at all during the campaign 
period. A duration randomization determined whether the price promotion(s) or overdraft 
availability reminder, and any related messaging subsequent to September 15, lasted until 
November 15 or December 15. 
Note that the bank sent at least one message to everyone in our sample during the experiment. 
It elected to do this because, like other banks, it often sends promotional and reminder 
messages to its customers. Thus it makes sense to evaluate the effects of an overdraft 
(incentive) message relative to a message that does not mention overdraft (incentives), rather 
than relative to an artificial no-message counterfactual. 
3.2 Baseline Data on Sample Characteristics, and Balance Checks 
The bank sought to promote overdraft usage among existing clients who might not otherwise 
overdraft, and therefore conducted the experiment on 108,000 checking account holders who 
had: (1) the overdraft service in place; (2) owned a YK checking account for at least a year 
and were in good standing; (3) a debit card linked to their YK checking account; (4) not used 
the overdraft service (to a first approximation) during the three months prior to the month the 
experiment started: May-July 2012. Many of these customers did have some prior experience 
with the product however. Our pre-treatment data go back as far as September 2011, and 
from September 2011-April 2012 18.4% of our sample overdrafted at least once, with an 
average daily balance of 4.42TL (SD 23.51, Max 940.47) among these accountholders. For 
comparison, 31% of our sample overdrafted at least once during the experiment (September 
15-December 31), with an average of 2.77 overdrafts during that period (SD 6.05, Max 27) 
and an average daily balance of 26.85TL (SD 77.97, Max 2696.58). 
Table 1 summarizes the baseline data available to us (Column 1) and checks balance across 
treatment assignments (Columns 2 -10). In terms of demographics, we only have information 
on gender (29% female), the city of residence (28% Istanbul, 23% outside the four largest 
cities), and marital status (57% married). This kind of information is collected by the bank at 
the account opening stage and can be updated later by the client. Besides pre-treatment data 
on overdraft usage (described above and in Table 1), we also have data on the other behaviors 
targeted by the experiment: debit card usage and automatic debits for bill payments. Each of 
columns 2-10 reports the results from an OLS regression of the treatment variable in the 
column heading on each of the row variables. As expected, point estimates tend to be small in 
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magnitude and statistically insignificant. The count of significant results is about what one 
would expect to find by chance.  The second-to-last-row reports the p-value from an F-test of 
the hypothesis that the RHS variables = 0.  
3.3 Follow-up data 
YK provided us with data on overdraft usage, debit card usage, direct debit authorizations, 
and deposit account balances, at the account-month level, from September 1, 2012 through 
the end of June 2013. In addition to the monthly data, YK provided us with daily data on 
overdraft usage for the experimental period: September 15-December 15, 2012. We use this 
data to construct outcome variables for estimating the short-run and longer-run treatment 
effects detailed in the next section. 
 
4. Specifications and Results  
We aggregate data to the client level (indexed by i) and estimate OLS regressions of the 
form: 
(1) Yi = a + BTi + CXi + e, 
where Y is an outcome of interest, in most cases some measure of a behavior targeted by the 
marketing campaign: overdraft usage, debit card usage, or an automatic debit for bill 
payment. In Tables 2-5 we measure outcomes over a time period designed to capture 
immediate/short-run treatment effects: September 15-December 31, since the bank sent 
everyone at least one promotional message starting September 15 and sent the last 
promotional messages on December 15. Tables 6-8 measure outcomes over a post-
experiment time period: January 2013-May 2013. We do not use June 2013 data in our 
analysis of long-run effects because the Turkish Central Bank announced an interest rate 
ceiling for overdrafts on May 27. 
T is a vector of treatment assignments (see Figure 1), with B the vector of estimated 
coefficients on those treatment variables. Our main tables define the treatment vector to test 
key predictions and features of models of shrouding and limited attention; Appendix Table 1 
presents results for each cell created by the randomizations.  X is a vector of the stratification 
variables used to block the randomization (see Table 1).  
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4.1 Main Results: Effects of Promotional Overdraft Pricing and Message Content on 
Overdrafting 
Table 2 reports estimates of the paper’s key treatment effects: the effects of different 
overdraft messages on overdraft usage during the experiment. 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 report estimates of the effect of offering a 50% discount on overdraft 
interest—and thereby mentioning something about the cost of overdrafting—on three 
different measures of overdraft usage. The row variable (2) captures this effect by comparing 
the performance of the three overdraft interest discount arms to the three arms that do not 
offer that discount. Column 1 shows that the effect on the extensive margin is negative: 
offering to cut the cost of overdrafting by one-half reduces the likelihood of overdrafting by 
0.65 percentage points (SE= 0.28).  
The magnitude of the effect in Column 1 is small—2 percent relative to the sample mean of 
0.31—but  likely economically significant, for several reasons. First, it suggests that drawing 
attention to overdraft costs induces upward-sloping demand. Framed differently, it suggests 
that messaging about costs without offering a discount—as one might contemplate as part of 
a pure debiasing strategy—would depress demand even more. Second, the messaging here 
does not mention the level of costs— again as one might contemplate as part of a pure 
debiasing strategy like “Beware of overdrafts at 60% APR!” Instead it offers to give back 
“half of the interest”. It seems plausible to think that messaging around the cost level might 
depress demand even more, particularly if consumers tend to underestimate add-on costs as 
assumed by shrouding models. Third, messaging costs are low, and hence bank strategy is 
sensitive to small changes in demand. Fourth, our estimates are in intention-to-treat (ITT) 
units, and we should keep in mind that some recipients may have ignored the messages and 
hence not actually been “treated”. Treatment-on-the-treated effects might be more 
informative for mapping the steady-state implications of our results, and they would be larger 
than the ITTs, but we have no good way of estimating how much larger in the context of this 
study. 
Turning to other measures of overdraft use, Column 3 shows that the overdraft discount offer 
reduces the count of days with an overdraft balance, by 0.073 days (SE= 0.037 days) over the 
course of the experiment. This is a 3% reduction relative to the mean of 2.77 days. Column 
5’s point estimate suggests a small reduction in the average daily overdraft balance (-0.11 TL 
on a base of 27TL) that is not statistically significant (SE =0.47). Overdraft balances are 
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right-skewed, and so we test sensitivity to outliers in Appendix Table 2. We find similar 
results across four different rules for dealing with the top 1% of overdraft balances: each of 
the four point estimates is small and negative. 
In all, Columns 1, 3, and 5 support a key prediction of shrouding models: drawing attention 
to the cost of a shrouded attribute reduces the demand for it (even, in our case, when offering 
a 50% discount!). We confirm that this lower demand likely maps into lower profitability for 
the bank in Appendix Table 3, which shows that deposit account balances (checking + 
saving) do not increase to offset promotion costs and lost overdraft revenue with increased 
implicit interest.27 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 report estimates for each of the four different overdraft messages relative 
to the two messages that did not mention overdrafts (instead mentioning only the debit card 
or auto-debit bill registration promotions). This specification unpacks the three different 
overdraft interest discount messages to test whether they have differential effects (p-values 
reported at the bottom of the table), and also identifies our second key result: the effect of the 
overdraft availability reminder that does not mention costs or offer a discount. 
Comparing the three different overdraft interest discount messages, we see two interesting 
patterns in Columns 2, 4, and 6. First, the negative point estimate for the overdraft interest 
discount goes away compared to Columns 1, 3 and 5 (it actually becomes slightly positive but 
not statistically significant in each case), suggesting that the overdraft discount by itself does 
not depress demand (row 3). Second, comparing the overdraft discount (row 3) to the bundled 
discounts (overdraft discount + auto-debit discount in row 4, overdraft discount + debit card 
discount in row 5), we find the reduced demand from the overdraft interest discount only 
manifests itself when mentioned in tandem with the debit card discount (and to a lesser 
extent, the auto-debit discount). We posit a salience mechanism: using the debit card without 
paying attention to one’s balance is exactly how one can find oneself in overdraft status 
without intending to do so. By bundling the two together, the consumer not only becomes 
increasingly aware of the price of overdraft, but is also reminded of the exact behavior to 
reduce, in order to reduce use of the overdraft. This is consistent with Stango and Zinman 
(2014), which finds that survey questions about spending control, monitoring account 
balances, or other bank fees induce overdraft reductions. 
27 Stango and Zinman (2014) also find that consumers do not engineer overdraft reductions by holding 
larger/buffer balances in their deposit accounts. 
16 
 
                                                          
The key finding in the even-numbered columns is that the overdraft availability reminder, 
which does not mention overdraft costs, increases overdraft usage relative to the non-
overdraft messages. In Column 2 we see that the availability reminder sent on September 
15th increases the likelihood of overdrafting during the experiment by 9/10 of a percentage 
point (SE= 4/10 of a pp), or 3% relative to the sample proportion. Column 4 shows that the 
simple reminder increases the count of days with an overdraft balance by 5%. Column 6 
shows an average daily balance increase of 0.95 TL (SE=0.70) on a base of 27 TL.28 We see 
a similar pattern of results for the days used and balance outcomes in the first row of Table 2, 
which reports estimates of the effect of getting the overdraft availability reminder on August 
30th relative to not getting any message on August 30th. 
The demand increase from the overdraft availability reminder is consistent with the overdraft 
feature—and not just its cost-- being far from top of mind: reminding someone of its 
availability and quantity (the size of the credit limit) increases usage. 
4.2 Do All Promotional Discounts Backfire? No. 
Table 3 checks whether other promotional discounts backfire as well, by estimating treatment 
effects of the debit card and auto-debit discount offers on their targeted behaviors during the 
experiment. Columns 1-4 show estimates of the effects of the debit card discount messages 
on two measures of debit card use for point-of-sale (POS) transactions: the extensive margin 
(Columns 1 and 2), and the count of debit card (POS) transactions. Each of the point 
estimates is positive, with one marginally statistically significant, suggesting that debit card 
discounts, unlike overdraft interest discounts, work (weakly) as intended by the bank. 
Columns 5-8 show estimates of the effects of the auto-debit discount message on the 
extensive margin of registering a bill payment for auto-debit. Because this type of transaction 
is low-prevalence—only 1.4% of our sample do it during the experiment— we report probit 
marginal effects (Columns 7 and 8) as well as OLS estimates (Columns 5 and 6). Here again 
each of the point estimates is positive. Both estimators find that the bundled discount—
overdraft interest discount + auto-debit discount—increases bill payment registration 
significantly (Columns 6 and 8). This suggests that bundled discounts have their intended 
effect on auto-debit enrollment, in contrast to their perverse effect (from the bank’s 
perspective) on overdrafting. 
28 We get similar results in the outlier sensitivity checks of Appendix Table 2. 
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In all, we find no evidence that promotional discounts targeting debit card use and auto-debit 
bill payments backfire, and some evidence that they increase demand as intended. 
4.3 Effects of Messaging Frequency on Overdrafting 
Returning to treatment effects on overdrafting, Table 4 examines the effects of the frequency 
treatments. Here we take the specifications in Table 2 and break out treatments by whether 
the bank sent any promotional messages after September 15 (odd-numbered columns), and 
then by the frequency of any messages subsequent to September 15 (even-numbered 
columns). The treatments of interest here vary only the frequency of messaging, not message 
content (Tables 2 and 3) or the amount of time promotional incentives are in place (Table 5). 
Columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10 suggest that demand decreases the more the bank advertises the 
overdraft interest discount. The point estimate for sending post-Sept 15 messages promoting 
the discount is more negative than the point estimate for not sending any post-Sept 15 
messages, for each of the three demand measures (Columns 1, 5, and 9), with p-values for the 
difference of 0.446, 0.003, and 0.007.29 Breaking out the post-Sept 15 messages into more 
versus less-frequent (every 10 vs. every 20 days), we find a bit more evidence suggesting that 
more intense messaging about the overdraft discount decreases demand (Columns 2, 6, and 
10): the point estimate on more-frequent messages is more negative than that on less-frequent 
messages for each of the three overdraft usage measures (row 3 vs. row 4), although none of 
these differences are statistically significant.  
Columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 suggest that demand increases the more the bank advertises 
overdraft availability. The overdraft availability reminder has no effect when sent on Sept 15 
without follow-up messages, but strongly increases demand when the bank does send 
subsequent messages (row 17 vs. row 18). 
All told, the results here suggest that messaging intensity reinforces the main effects we find 
in Table 2: messaging more depresses demand more in the case of the overdraft interest 
discount, and increases demand more in the case of the overdraft availability reminder.  
  
29 There is even a bit of evidence that one-shot messaging about the overdraft interest discount 
actually increases demand (row 1, Columns 9 and 10). We discuss some additional evidence on one-
shot messaging in the next sub-section, with respect to our analysis of the duration treatment. 
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4.4 Effects of Promotional Duration (*Messaging Frequency) on Overdrafting 
Table 5 examines another margin of messaging and promotional intensity—the “duration”, or 
length of time over which the bank continued to send messages and offer discounts. Short-
duration campaigns lasted until November 15th, while long-duration campaigns continued 
until December 15th. We find little evidence that duration alone affects demand, either for the 
overdraft interest discount (row 1 versus row 2), or for the overdraft availability reminder 
(row 7 versus row 8). 
Promotional intensity depends on duration and frequency, so we explore these interactions in 
the remaining columns of Table 5. Columns 2, 5, and 8 focus on the overdraft interest 
discount. Comparing, e.g., the most-intense promotion (row 3: long duration + messages after 
Sept. 15) to the least-intense promotion (row 6: short duration, no messages after Sept 15), 
we find lower demand for the most-intense promotion in all three cases, with p-values of 
0.55, 0.15, and 0.03. Columns 3, 6, and 9 also show results for the overdraft availability 
reminder, and again we find bigger effects on demand—an increase in this case-- for the 
most-intense promotion (row 7) compared to the least-intense promotion (row 9), with p-
values of 0.07, 0.25, and 0.02. 
Table 4 shows a hint of evidence that one-shot messaging about the overdraft interest 
discount induces a normal rather than perverse demand response, and we explore that further 
in rows 5 and 6 of Table 5. These rows capture groups that received only one message about 
the discount, on Sept 15, with an offer that was good until Dec. 15 (row 5) or Nov. 15 (row 
6). These one-shot messages have basically null effects on the extensive margin (Column 2), 
while three of the four coefficients on overdraft days and overdraft balance are positive 
(Columns 5 and 8), with p-values of 0.1479, 0.0446, and 0.8158. Columns 3, 6, and 9 permit 
the same comparison between row 5 and row 6, but with the omitted group as no mention of 
overdraft instead of no overdraft interest discount. 
All told, we infer two qualitative findings from Table 5. First, more-intense promotions 
amplify the demand-depressing effect of the overdraft interest incentive and the demand-
increasing effect of the overdraft availability reminder. This also implies that demand 
responds more normally—in relative terms at least—to less-intense price promotion. Second, 
there is a bit of evidence that demand responds normally, in absolute terms, to a one-shot 
message about the overdraft interest discount. 
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4.5 Results for Full-Factorial Design 
The regression models estimated thus far impose some theory to group treatment cells; we 
also report results for each individual test cell in Appendix Table 1. 
 
4.6 Heterogeneous Effects of Overdraft Messaging? 
Shrouding models, and models of limited attention and salience like Bordalo et al (2014), 
predict that responses to the advertising of add-ons will vary with how well-informed and/or 
attentive the consumer is. For example, a well-informed and attentive consumer should 
respond normally to the overdraft interest discount, and weakly if at all to the overdraft 
availability reminder.  
We construct two proxies for baseline exposure to the overdraft product and then test for 
whether each proxy mediates our main treatment effects. The first proxy is recent overdraft 
use prior to the experiment. 18% of our sample overdrafted at some point during February-
August 2012. (Recall that the pre-treatment proportion overdrafting is lower than the 
proportion overdrafting during or post- the experiment, presumably because the bank selected 
clients with low pre-experiment overdraft activity for the study.) Appendix Table 4 interacts a 
prior use indicator with our main treatment variables and shows little evidence of 
heterogeneous treatment effects (p-values at the bottom of the table). The second proxy is 
generated by the August 30th message YK sent to half of the sample. This initial overdraft 
availability reminder may have provided some consumers with information and/or drawn 
their attention to the add-on. But Appendix Table 5 finds little evidence that the August 30th 
message dampens (or amplifies) the effects of subsequent messages (p-values at bottom of 
the table). 
4.7 Do Treatment Effects Persist? Post-Experiment Effects of Overdraft Messaging 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 re-estimate our primary specifications (Table 2), message frequency 
specifications (Table 4), and duration specifications (Table 5) on overdraft usage after the 
promotional campaign stops. Specifically, we measure the extensive margin and average 
daily balances using monthly data covering the period January-May, 2013.30 (Recall that the 
most-intensively treated accountholders in our experiment received their last message on 
December 15, 2012.) We find little evidence that treatment effects persist—there are no more 
30 We lack daily data for the post-experiment period and hence cannot calculate our days-with-a-
balance variable. 
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statistically significant results than one would expect to find by chance—and therefore little 
evidence that consumers persist with the behaviors induced by the bank’s promotions during 
the experiment. 
5. Conclusion 
Working with a large Turkish bank to test SMS direct marketing promotions to 108,000 
existing checking account holders, we find that messages promoting a 50% discount on the 
overdraft interest rate reduce overdraft usage. In contrast, messages that merely mention 
overdraft availability without mentioning price increase usage. Neither change persists long 
after messages stop, suggesting that induced change in overdrafting is not habit-forming. We 
also find some evidence that messaging intensity reinforces the main effects of overdraft 
discounts and availability reminders—messaging more about the overdraft discount further 
reduces demand, while messaging more about overdraft availability further increases 
demand—and that messages offering discounts on debit card or auto-debit use along with 
overdraft backfire more than simply offering a discount on overdrafts. But not all messages 
backfire: we find some evidence that debit card and auto-debit discounts increase usage of 
those features, and that a one-shot message about the overdraft discount actually increases 
overdraft usage. 
These results are consistent with the Bordalo et al (2014) model of limited memory and 
attention. They also support the key prediction of equilibrium shrouding models: that firms 
lack incentives to draw attention to, or otherwise compete on, add-on prices. However we 
emphasize that our study does not map directly to most shrouding models, as most shrouding 
models focus on competition at the customer acquisition stage rather than the post-acquisition 
setting we have here. 
Our results also support policymakers’ increasing scrutiny of add-on features, pricing, and 
practices, although we emphasize that we do not conduct welfare analysis that ought motivate 
and guide policy interventions. 
Practically speaking, our results suggest that competing on overdraft prices will not capture 
market share or increase usage, and thus will lower revenue. Although cutting overdraft 
prices could in principle generate more customer loyalty or reciprocity, the fact that induced 
overdraft behavior does not persist suggests these sorts of long-term benefits will not 
materialize for banks. More subtly, our results should also give pause to third parties seeking 
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to improve overdraft markets with messages (like social marketing campaigns) that draw 
attention to overdraft costs.31 The lack of habit formation in our results suggests that 
messaging would have to be sustained to affect behavior, and the effects of various bank 
messages on short-term demand suggest that banks would have incentives to counter any 
“debiasing” campaigns with overdraft-promoting campaigns.  
Opportunities for future work abound. We think the most promising direction is one that 
pushes towards welfare analysis. This may require far more household-level consumption and 
expenditure data than is typically available from administrative data alone, although the 
growth of electronic payments and credit bureaus suggests possibilities for complementing or 
substituting for survey data. Furthermore, refinements to our design could help further tease 
out and test across models, for instance testing promotions that mention price without cutting 
it, and mentioning information on price levels as well as or instead of discounts. Other key 
potential refinements include measuring consumer price and usage perceptions at baseline 
and/or endline, as well as examining how awareness and pricing of overdrafts, and other add-
ons in consumer finance, influences customer acquisition.  
  
31 Such third parties might include personal financial management providers, regulators, nonprofit 
credit counselors, and consumer advocacy groups. 
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Figure 1. Experimental Design 
 Overdraft Availability Reminder- 50% (n=54,000) - "We remind you that, for your immediate cash needs, you have a 
Flexible Account at Yapi Kredi with [fill]TL limit. Have a nice day" 
 
No Message  50% (n=54,000) 
 
Produced by 
Randomizing: 
 
Overdraft Interest 
Discount 
or 
 Overdraft Availability 
Reminder  
 
x 
 
Auto-Debit Discount  
or 
Debit Card Discount 
or 
 Overdraft Availability 
Reminder 
Overdraft Interest Discount, no other discount (n=17,977) - "Use your Yapi Kredi Flexible Account and we will give 
you back half of the interest that is accrued between now and [November/December] 15 as WP." 
 
Auto-Debit Discount (n=18,021) - "Authorize automatic bill payments from your account before 
[November/December] 15 and receive up to a maximum of 30TL WP." 
  
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount (n=17,981)- "Authorize automatic bill payments from your 
account before [November/December] 15, receive up to a maximum of 30TL WP, and we will give you back half of 
your Flexible Account's accrued interest between now and [November/December] 15 as WP." 
 
Debit Card Discount (n=17,983) - "Use your Yapi Kredi debit card and earn 5% of your shopping, up to 25TL WP, 
between now and [November/December] 15." 
  
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount (n=17,995) - "Use your Yapi Kredi debit card and earn 5% of your 
shopping, up to 25TL WP, and we will give you back half of your Flexible Account's accrued interest between now 
and [November/December] 15 as WP." 
  
Overdraft Availability Reminder (n=18,043) - "We remind you that, for your immediate cash needs, you have a 
Flexible Account at Yapi Kredi with [fill]TL limit. Have a nice day." 
Short Duration - Sept 25, 2012 - Nov 15, 2012 (n=54,044) 
Long Duration - Sept 25, 2012 - Dec 15, 2012 (n=53,956) 
Frequent Messaging - Msg repeats every 10 Days (n=35,985) 
Less-frequent Messaging - Msg repeats every 20 Days  (n=36,052) 
 No Additional Messaging after September 15 (n=35,963) 
August 30th 2012 
if sent 
September 15th 
Message 
Messages 
subsequent to 
Sept 15, if any 
“TL” = Turkish Lira. 1TL = US$0.56 as of September 2012. “WP”= redeemable reward points.  
Yapi Kredi = the implementing bank. 
Duration of any 
incentives and 
any subsequent 
messages 
Baseline Mean 
& SE
August 30 
Message: 
Overdraft 
Availability 
Reminder 
September 15 
Message: 
Overdraft 
Interest 
Discount
Overdraft 
Interest 
Discount + 
Subsequent 
Messages
Auto-Debit 
Discount Only
Auto-Debit 
Discount (w/o 
OI Discount) + 
Subsequent 
Messages
September 15 
Message: 
Overdraft 
Interest 
Discount + 
Auto-Debit 
Discount
Debit Card 
Discount Only
Debit Card 
Discount (w/o 
OI Discount) + 
Subsequent 
Messages
September 15 
Message: 
Overdraft 
Interest 
Discount + 
Debit Card 
Discount
Baseline Stratification Variables (July 2012) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female 0.289 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0025)
Lives in Istanbul 0.275 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0004
(0.001) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0027)
Lives in Ankara 0.090 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0020 0.0010 -0.0000 0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0013 0.0006
(0.001) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0041)
Lives in Izmir 0.050 -0.0009 -0.0020 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0010 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0015
(0.001) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0053)
Lives in Bursa 0.057 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0012 0.0012 0.0029 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0028
(0.001) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0050)
Married 0.572 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002
(0.002) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Overdraft Limit Between 1/2 and 1 monthly min wage 0.284 -0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001
(0.001) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0026)
Overdraft Limit > monthly min wage 0.081 -0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0047 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0043
omitted category: overdraft limit < 1/2 monthly min wage (0.001) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0043)
Overdraft Acct Bal: Balance below med 0.428 0.0042 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.002) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0035)
Overdraft Acct Bal: Balance above med 0.427 0.0038 0.0021 0.0007 0.0008 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0001
omitted category= zero balance (0.002) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0035)
Baseline Values of Outcome Variables
Avg Overdraft Balance Sept 2011-Apr 2012 > 0 0.184 0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0059** -0.0029 -0.0001 0.0049* 0.0024 -0.0024
(0.001) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0030)
Auto Bill Pay Registered any time Sept 2011-July 2012 0.012 0.0023 0.0094 0.0052 0.0083 -0.0102 0.0198* -0.0072 -0.0034 0.0046
(0.000) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0131) (0.0104) (0.0088) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0087) (0.0104)
Count Debit Card POS Transactions Sept 2011-July 2012 > 0 0.334 -0.0011 0.0031 0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0031 -0.0026 0.0040 0.0026 0.0049*
(omitted category= zero transactions) (0.001) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0025)
F-test of joint significance of all RHS variables 0.9369 0.6596 0.7164 0.0592 0.1136 0.2385 0.1033 0.4176 0.1976
Observations 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000
Table 1: Orthogonality Checks
Notes: Column 1 reports the baseline mean and standard error of each row variable. Columns 2-10 each report the coefficients of a single OLS regression of each treatment in the column header on each row variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
August 30 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (1) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0869** 0.0869** 1.0552** 1.0554**
       Omitted category for (1): No August 30 Message (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.4701) (0.4701)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount (2) -0.0065** -0.0728** -0.1057
       Omitted cat for (2): No Overdraft Interest Discount (0.0028) (0.0365) (0.4688)
0.0020 0.0467 0.6179
(0.0042) (0.0550) (0.6887)
-0.0048 -0.0564 -0.1347
(0.0042) (0.0544) (0.6988)
-0.0078* -0.0763 0.1573
(0.0042) (0.0541) (0.7236)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (6) 0.0089** 0.1321** 0.9562
Omitted category for (3)-(6): No Mention of Overdraft (0.0042) (0.0553) (0.7029)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (6) 0.1588 0.1824 0.6765
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.1592 0.1035 0.3519
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (5) 0.0432 0.0509 0.5782
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (4) & (6) 0.0048 0.0030 0.1831
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.0006 0.0010 0.3414
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 0.3077 2.7676 2.7676 26.8511 26.8511
std dev (0.46) (0.46) (6.05) (6.05) (77.97) (77.97)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Table 2. Effects of First Two Overdraft Messages on Overdraft Usage, During Experiment
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56 USD. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents
results from a single regression of the dependent variable (column header) on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1
summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. All variables cover the time period September 15-December 31, 2012.
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (TL)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; No Other 
Discount (3)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Auto-Debit 
Discount (4)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Debit Card 
Discount (5)
Overdraft Account Used Days with Overdraft Balance
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Mfx Probit Mfx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debit Card Discount Only 0.0055 0.0067* 0.0222 0.0347
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0398) (0.0405)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount 0.0059 0.0622
(0.0039) (0.0408)
Auto-Debit Discount Only 0.0010 0.0014 0.0007 0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount 0.0022** 0.0015**
(0.0010) (0.0007)
Mean (standard deviation) dependent variable 0.3367 0.3367 1.9872 1.9872 0.0141 0.0141 0.0141 0.0141
(0.47) (0.47) (4.93) (4.93) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Omitted Category All Other 
Messages
No mention 
of Debit 
Card 
Discount
All Other 
Messages
No mention 
of Debit 
Card 
Discount
All Other 
Messages
No Mention 
of Auto-
Debit 
Discount
All Other 
Messages
No Mention 
of Auto-
Debit 
Discount
Observations 108,000 108,000 107,999 107,999 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Notes: OLS or Probits (marginal effects) with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56 USD. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results from a single
regression of the dependent variable on the treatment variables shown, a control for the treatment assignment in the August 30th mailer, and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the
experimental design and shows message scripts. All variables cover the time period September 15-December 31, 2012.
Table 3. Effects of Auto-Debit and Debit Card Messages on Auto Debit and Debit Card Usage, During Experiment
Any Debit Card Purchase 
Transactions
Count Debit Card Purchase 
Transactions
Any Bill Payment Registered for Auto-Debit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Overdraft Interest Discount + No Messages after Sept 15 (1) -0.0044 -0.0044 0.0374 0.0374 1.2119* 1.2119*
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.6885) (0.6885)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Messages after Sept 15 (2) -0.0076** -0.1278*** -0.7636
(0.0031) (0.0404) (0.5187)
Overdraft Interest Discount + More-Frequent Messages (3) -0.0100** -0.1690*** -0.8826
(0.0039) (0.0508) (0.6639)
Overdraft  Interest Discount + Less-Frequent Messages (4) -0.0051 -0.0865* -0.6447
(0.0040) (0.0511) (0.6486)
-0.0037 -0.0037 0.1136 0.1136 1.5653 1.5653
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0858) (0.0858) (1.0885) (1.0885)
0.0049 0.0132 0.1441
(0.0049) (0.0631) (0.7838)
Overdraft + No Other Discount + More-Frequent Messages (7)
0.0012 -0.0110 -0.1341
(0.0064) (0.0834) (1.0296)
Overdraft + No Other Discount + Less-Frequent Messages (8) 0.0085 0.0374 0.4222
(0.0065) (0.0835) (1.0411)
0.0026 0.0026 0.1158 0.1158 2.5741** 2.5741**
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0856) (0.0856) (1.1938) (1.1938)
-0.0085* -0.1426** -1.4901*
(0.0048) (0.0620) (0.7665)
-0.0112* -0.1852** -1.5869
(0.0064) (0.0817) (1.0044)
-0.0059 -0.0999 -1.3933
(0.0064) (0.0817) (1.0160)
-0.0031 -0.0031 0.0148 0.0148 0.4512 0.4512
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0839) (0.0839) (1.0820) (1.0821)
-0.0101** -0.1216** 0.0111
(0.0048) (0.0619) (0.8535)
-0.0112* -0.1785** 0.0303
(0.0064) (0.0806) (1.1850)
-0.0090 -0.0649 -0.0083
(0.0064) (0.0827) (1.0906)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + No Msgs after Sept 15 (17) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0429 0.0429 -0.3107 -0.3106
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0835) (0.0835) (1.0420) (1.0420)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + Msgs after Sept 15 (18) 0.0132*** 0.1765*** 1.5874*
(0.0049) (0.0644) (0.8283)
0.0136** 0.2119** 1.4985
(0.0065) (0.0854) (1.0996)
0.0127** 0.1411* 1.6761
(0.0065) (0.0855) (1.1017)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (1) & (2) 0.4461 0.0028 0.0066
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.3103 0.1838 0.7673
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.2359 0.2991 0.2437
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (7) & (8) 0.9162 0.5284 0.9025
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (9) & (10) 0.1265 0.0070 0.0018
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (11) & (12) 0.3903 0.6576 0.6809
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (13) & (14) 0.3291 0.1478 0.7266
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (15) & (16) 0.5285 0.4237 0.8830
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (17) & (18) 0.0785 0.1623 0.1167
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (19) & (20)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 0.3077 0.3077 0.3077 2.7676 2.7676 2.7676 2.7676 26.8511 26.8511 26.8511 26.8511
(std dev) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (6.05) (6.05) (6.05) (6.05) (77.97) (77.97) (77.97) (77.97)
Omitted category
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card + Less-Frequent Messages 
(16)
No Overdraft Discount No  Mention Overdraft No Overdraft Discount No  Mention Overdraft
Overdraft Availability Reminder + More-Frequent Msgs (19)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + Less-Frequent Msgs (20)
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results from a single regression of the dependent variable on the treatment variables shown
and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. All variables cover the time period September 15-December 31, 2012.
Table 4. Effects of Message Frequency on Overdraft Usage, During Experiment
Overdraft Account Used Days with Overdraft Balance Avg Overdraft Account Balance (TL)
Overdraft Interest Discount + No Other Discount + No Messages after 
Sept 15 (5)
Overdraft Interest Discount + No Other Discount + Messages after 
Sept 15 (6)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount + No Messages 
after Sept 15 (9)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount + Messages after 
Sept 15 (10)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount + No Messages 
after Sept 15 (13)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount + Messages after 
Sept 15 (14)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount + More-Frequent 
Messages (11)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit + Less-Frequent Messages 
(12)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card + More-Frequent Messages 
(15)
No Overdraft Discount No  Mention Overdraft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
-0.0075** -0.0587 -0.4292
(0.0034) (0.0448) (0.5768)
-0.0055 -0.0868* 0.2174
(0.0034) (0.0444) (0.5773)
-0.0102*** -0.0072* -0.1392*** -0.0952* -1.4967** -1.1777*
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0510) (0.0541) (0.6487) (0.6858)
-0.0049 -0.0020 -0.1163** -0.0722 -0.0323 0.2866
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0509) (0.0540) (0.6648) (0.7005)
-0.0021 0.0009 0.1020 0.1461** 1.7020* 2.0211**
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0705) (0.0727) (0.9366) (0.9619)
-0.0067 -0.0037 -0.0276 0.0165 0.7186 1.0371
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0686) (0.0709) (0.8987) (0.9256)
0.0154** 0.1719** 3.1078***
(0.0065) (0.0857) (1.1832)
0.0109* 0.1811** 0.0710
(0.0065) (0.0853) (1.0162)
0.0003 0.0430 -0.3088
(0.0064) (0.0835) (1.0420)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (1) & (2) 0.6185 0.5849 0.3365
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.2764 0.2764 0.7113 0.7112 0.0692 0.0692
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (5) 0.1706 0.1706 0.0022 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (6) 0.5526 0.5526 0.1481 0.1481 0.0277 0.0278
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.5011 0.5011 0.1556 0.1556 0.4179 0.4176
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (7) & (8) 0.5931 0.9346 0.0370
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (7) & (9) 0.0738 0.2460 0.0206
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 0.3077 0.3077 2.7676 2.7676 2.7676 26.8511 26.8511 26.8511
std dev (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (6.05) (6.05) (6.05) (77.97) (77.97) (77.97)
Omitted Category No Mention 
Overdraft
No Mention 
Overdraft
No Mention 
Overdraft
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results from a single regression of the LHS variable on
the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. All variables cover the time period September 15-December
31, 2012. Long duration campaign ends Dec 15, short duration campaign ends Nov 15.
Overdraft Interest Discount: short duration+ messages after 
Sept 15 (4)
Overdraft Interest Discount: long duration, no messages after 
Sept 15 (5)
Overdraft Interest Discount: short duration, no messages after 
Sept 15 (6)
Overdraft Availability Reminder: long duration+ messages after 
Sept 15 (7)
Overdraft Availability Reminder, short duration+ messages 
after Sept 15 (8)
Overdraft Availability Reminder, no messages after Sept 15 (9)
Table 5. Effects of Message and Discount Duration on Overdraft Usage, During Experiment
No Overdraft Discount No Overdraft Discount No Overdraft Discount
Overdraft Interest Discount: long duration + messages after 
Sept 15 (3)
Overdraft Account Used Days with Overdraft Balance Avg Overdraft Account Balance (TL)
Overdraft Interest Discount: long duration (1)
Overdraft Interest Discount: short duration (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
August 30 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (1) -0.0004 -0.0004 0.7385 0.7383
       Omitted category for (1): No August 30 Message (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.6262) (0.6262)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount (2) -0.0013 0.1405
       Omitted cat for (2): No Overdraft Interest Discount (0.0029) (0.6242)
0.0031 0.9005
(0.0044) (0.9471)
-0.0012 -0.6743
(0.0044) (0.9127)
-0.0004 0.2274
(0.0044) (0.9532)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (6) 0.0055 0.0320
Omitted category for (3)-(6): No Mention of Overdraft (0.0044) (0.9344)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (6) 0.6312 0.4310
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.4042 0.1463
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (5) 0.4933 0.5473
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (4) & (6) 0.1884 0.5101
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.2434 0.8597
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3713 0.3713 34.0032 34.0032
std dev (0.48) (0.48) (103.98) (103.98)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each
column presents results from a single regression of the LHS variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not
shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. Overdraft data covers January-May 2013; experimental
messages and promotional prices stopped December 15, 2012 at latest.
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; No Other Discount (3)
Table 6. Effects of First Two Overdraft Messages on Overdraft Usage, After Experiment
Overdraft Account Used
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (TL)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Auto-Debit Discount 
(4)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Debit Card Discount 
(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overdraft Interest Discount + No Messages after Sept 15 (1) 0.0039 0.0039 1.2187 1.2187
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.9166) (0.9166)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Messages after Sept 15 (2) -0.0040 -0.3978
(0.0033) (0.6908)
Overdraft Interest Discount + More-Frequent Messages (3) -0.0043 -0.7662
(0.0041) (0.8815)
Overdraft  Interest Discount + Less-Frequent Messages (4) -0.0037 -0.0299
(0.0041) (0.8666)
0.0052 0.0052 3.1489** 3.1489**
(0.0067) (0.0067) (1.5726) (1.5727)
0.0020 -0.2227
(0.0051) (1.0586)
Overdraft + No Other Discount + More-Frequent Messages (7)
-0.0011 -0.0027
(0.0067) (1.4184)
Overdraft + No Other Discount + Less-Frequent Messages (8)
0.0051 -0.4430
(0.0067) (1.3828)
0.0103 0.0103 0.5568 0.5568
(0.0068) (0.0068) (1.4538) (1.4538)
-0.0069 -1.2907
(0.0051) (1.0333)
-0.0060 -2.0946
(0.0067) (1.3311)
-0.0078 -0.4861
(0.0067) (1.3940)
0.0018 0.0018 -0.0186 -0.0186
(0.0067) (0.0067) (1.4535) (1.4535)
-0.0015 0.3498
(0.0051) (1.1122)
-0.0001 -0.1692
(0.0067) (1.5320)
-0.0029 0.8672
(0.0067) (1.4300)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + No Msgs after Sept 15 (17) -0.0021 -0.0021 -1.9972 -1.9972
(0.0067) (0.0067) (1.3155) (1.3155)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + Msgs after Sept 15 (18) 0.0093* 1.0436
(0.0051) (1.1198)
0.0106 1.3578
(0.0067) (1.4935)
0.0080 0.7297
(0.0067) (1.4928)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (1) & (2) 0.0731 0.0952
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.9108 0.4919
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.1366 0.0511
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (7) & (8) 0.6815 0.0530
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (9) & (10) 0.7627 0.7505
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (11) & (12) 0.0239 0.2541
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (13) & (14) 0.4818 0.8103
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (15) & (16) 0.6656 0.8255
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (17) & (18) 0.8399 0.3655
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3713 0.3713 0.3713 0.3713 34.0032 34.0032 34.0032 34.0032
std dev (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (103.98) (103.98) (103.98) (103.98)
Omitted Category
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount + No Messages 
after Sept 15 (9)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount + Messages 
after Sept 15 (10)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount + No Messages 
after Sept 15 (13)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount + Messages 
after Sept 15 (14)
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results from a single regression
of the dependent variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. Overdraft
data covers January-May 2013; experimental messages and promotional prices stopped December 15, 2012 at latest.
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount + More-
Frequent Messages (11)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit + Less-Frequent 
Messages (12)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card + More-Frequent 
Messages (15)
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card + Less-Frequent 
Messages (16)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + More-Frequent Msgs (19)
Overdraft Availability Reminder + Less-Frequent Msgs (20)
No Overdraft Discount No Overdraft DiscountNo Mention Overdraft No Mention Overdraft
Overdraft Interest Discount + No Other Discount + Messages after 
Sept 15 (6)
Table 7. Effects of Message Frequency on Overdraft Usage, After Experiment
Overdraft Account Used Avg Overdraft Account Balance (TL)
Overdraft Interest Discount + No Other Discount + No Messages 
after Sept 15 (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0027 0.1781
(0.0036) (0.7704)
-0.0054 0.1029
(0.0036) (0.7665)
-0.0013 0.0006 -1.2159 -1.2054
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.8622) (0.9122)
-0.0067 -0.0048 0.4173 0.4277
(0.0041) (0.0044) (0.8873) (0.9359)
0.0106* 0.0124** 2.9604** 2.9710**
(0.0055) (0.0057) (1.2653) (1.2994)
-0.0028 -0.0009 -0.5295 -0.5197
(0.0055) (0.0057) (1.1759) (1.2129)
0.0073 2.5203
(0.0067) (1.5348)
0.0113* -0.429
(0.0067) (1.4496)
-0.0021 -1.9961
(0.0067) (1.3155)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (1) & (2) 0.0519 0.9331
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.2856 0.2856 0.1282 0.1282
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.0642 0.0642 0.0307 0.0307
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (7) & (8) 0.652 0.1353
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3713 0.3713 0.3713 34.0032 34.0032 34.0032
std dev (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (103.98) (103.98) (103.98)
Omitted Category No Mention 
Overdraft
No Mention 
Overdraft
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents
results from a single regression of the LHS variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the
experimental design and shows message scripts. Overdraft data covers January-May 2013; experimental messages and promotional prices stopped December
15, 2012 at latest.
Table 8. Effects of Message and Discount Duration on Overdraft Usage, After Experiment
No Overdraft Discount No Overdraft Discount
Overdraft Account Used Avg Overdraft Account Balance (TL)
Overdraft Interest Discount: long duration (1)
Overdraft Interest Discount: short duration (2)
Overdraft Interest Discount: long duration + messages after 
Sept 15 (3)
Overdraft Interest Discount: short duration+ messages after 
Sept 15 (4)
Overdraft Interest Discount: long duration, no messages 
after Sept 15 (5)
Overdraft Interest Discount: short duration, no messages 
after Sept 15 (6)
Overdraft Availability Reminder: long duration+ messages 
after Sept 15 (7)
Overdraft Availability Reminder, short duration+ messages 
after Sept 15 (8)
Overdraft Availability Reminder, no messages after Sept 
15 (9)
Overdraft 
Account Used
Days with 
Overdraft 
Balance
Avg Overdraft 
Account 
Balance (TL)
Whether Auto 
Bill Pay 
Registered
Any Debit 
Card POS 
Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ignoring August 30th Message
Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent Messages 0.4753*** 6.6465*** 69.4826*** 0.0206 0.2621***
(0.0513) (0.9412) (17.9091) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages 0.4974*** 6.7480*** 69.0719*** 0.0172 0.2938***
(0.0513) (0.9402) (17.8925) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.5033*** 6.7127*** 70.2925*** 0.0183 0.2649***
(0.0513) (0.9409) (17.9060) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent Messages 0.4965*** 6.8631*** 70.3677*** 0.0204 0.2835***
(0.0513) (0.9401) (17.8979) (0.0144) (0.0461)
Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages 0.4845*** 6.5133*** 67.3878*** 0.0181 0.2679***
(0.0513) (0.9391) (17.8868) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.4931*** 6.6454*** 67.2711*** 0.0211 0.2869***
(0.0513) (0.9388) (17.8759) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4921*** 6.6946*** 70.8506*** 0.0211 0.2702***
(0.0513) (0.9396) (17.9119) (0.0144) (0.0461)
0.4803*** 6.4125*** 66.6089*** 0.0235 0.2766***
(0.0513) (0.9396) (17.8884) (0.0145) (0.0460)
0.4898*** 6.6194*** 68.8597*** 0.0229 0.2787***
(0.0513) (0.9391) (17.8933) (0.0145) (0.0460)
0.4925*** 6.8203*** 71.0241*** 0.0227 0.2819***
(0.0513) (0.9400) (17.9075) (0.0145) (0.0460)
0.4767*** 6.5010*** 66.9488*** 0.0183 0.2656***
(0.0513) (0.9391) (17.8876) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4777*** 6.4638*** 65.0691*** 0.0240* 0.2628***
(0.0513) (0.9388) (17.8787) (0.0145) (0.0460)
0.4905*** 6.6338*** 67.8737*** 0.0214 0.2694***
(0.0513) (0.9403) (17.8880) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4758*** 6.4961*** 69.0251*** 0.0205 0.2830***
(0.0513) (0.9393) (17.9083) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4797*** 6.4287*** 68.0465*** 0.0185 0.2858***
(0.0513) (0.9399) (17.9057) (0.0144) (0.0461)
0.4828*** 6.6793*** 69.7591*** 0.0178 0.2784***
(0.0513) (0.9399) (17.9093) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4811*** 6.4305*** 67.7640*** 0.0209 0.2683***
(0.0513) (0.9391) (17.9156) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4817*** 6.7251*** 68.6645*** 0.0232 0.2885***
(0.0513) (0.9397) (17.8901) (0.0145) (0.0460)
Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent Messages 0.4935*** 6.7328*** 69.4325*** 0.0257* 0.2911***
(0.0513) (0.9397) (17.8869) (0.0147) (0.0461)
Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages 0.4764*** 6.5336*** 66.2380*** 0.0206 0.2714***
(0.0513) (0.9404) (17.8830) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.4814*** 6.5338*** 67.2283*** 0.0179 0.2616***
(0.0513) (0.9385) (17.8815) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent Messages 0.4831*** 6.5890*** 69.3451*** 0.0227 0.2646***
(0.0513) (0.9401) (17.8996) (0.0145) (0.0460)
Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages 0.4800*** 6.5468*** 66.9282*** 0.0211 0.2811***
(0.0513) (0.9395) (17.8943) (0.0144) (0.0461)
Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.4940*** 6.6645*** 69.3493*** 0.0197 0.2742***
(0.0513) (0.9397) (17.9034) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent Messages 0.4976*** 6.7254*** 69.3384*** 0.0190 0.2697***
(0.0513) (0.9399) (17.9203) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages 0.4968*** 6.7938*** 69.0150*** 0.0189 0.2964***
(0.0513) (0.9396) (17.8869) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.4965*** 6.6716*** 68.7787*** 0.0196 0.2774***
(0.0513) (0.9393) (17.8921) (0.0144) (0.0461)
Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent Messages 0.4916*** 6.5828*** 68.0561*** 0.0200 0.2821***
(0.0513) (0.9411) (17.8832) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages 0.4849*** 6.6024*** 67.1635*** 0.0219 0.2733***
(0.0513) (0.9403) (17.8856) (0.0145) (0.0460)
Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.5006*** 6.7248*** 69.4946*** 0.0200 0.2792***
(0.0513) (0.9407) (17.8924) (0.0147) (0.0460)
0.4961*** 6.7395*** 69.2084*** 0.0187 0.2605***
(0.0513) (0.9397) (17.8994) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, Frequent Messages 0.5027*** 6.9343*** 69.0230*** 0.0207 0.2645***
(0.0513) (0.9417) (17.9376) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.4984*** 6.7113*** 67.8470*** 0.0182 0.2832***
(0.0513) (0.9392) (17.8816) (0.0144) (0.0460)
0.4839*** 6.6301*** 66.9013*** 0.0192 0.2633***
(0.0513) (0.9392) (17.8800) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, Frequent Messages 0.5039*** 6.7725*** 70.7033*** 0.0212 0.2741***
(0.0513) (0.9415) (18.2977) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages 0.5064*** 6.8546*** 72.2391*** 0.0210 0.2669***
(0.0513) (0.9403) (17.9163) (0.0144) (0.0460)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 2.7676 26.8511 0.0141 0.3367
std dev (0.46) (6.05) (77.97) (0.12) (0.47)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Appendix Table 1: Panel A All Treatments on All Outcomes, During Experiment
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results
from a single regression of the LHS variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown) and no constant. Figure 1 ummarizes the
experimental design and shows message scripts. Outcome data from Sept 15-Dec 31, 2012.
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, No 
Subsequent Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Frequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, No 
Subsequent Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Frequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, No 
Subsequent Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Frequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, No 
Subsequent Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Frequent 
Messages
Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Overdraft 
Account Used
Days with 
Overdraft 
Balance
Avg Overdraft 
Account 
Balance (TL)
Whether Auto 
Bill Pay 
Registered
Any Debit 
Card POS 
Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B1: With August 30th Message (Aug 30 Msg vs No Aug 30 Msg)
0.4799*** 6.6662*** 69.3940*** 0.0196 0.2442***
(0.0518) (0.9464) (17.9384) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4887*** 6.8659*** 69.5985*** 0.0178 0.2863***
(0.0518) (0.9469) (17.9085) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4898*** 6.7603*** 71.4926*** 0.0204 0.2776***
(0.0518) (0.9465) (17.9571) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.5085*** 7.0577*** 72.1432*** 0.0164 0.2795***
(0.0519) (0.9474) (17.9219) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4818*** 6.4903*** 68.1784*** 0.0183 0.2684***
(0.0518) (0.9448) (17.9290) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4961*** 6.5427*** 67.3928*** 0.0218 0.2796***
(0.0518) (0.9438) (17.8854) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4897*** 6.6956*** 70.9056*** 0.0231 0.2688***
(0.0518) (0.9459) (17.9555) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4672*** 6.3453*** 64.7294*** 0.0204 0.2770***
(0.0518) (0.9440) (17.8960) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4914*** 6.6671*** 70.0249*** 0.0229 0.2723***
(0.0518) (0.9453) (17.9444) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.5012*** 6.7395*** 68.4124*** 0.0245* 0.2885***
(0.0519) (0.9460) (17.8889) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4740*** 6.3911*** 66.0834*** 0.0182 0.2761***
(0.0518) (0.9444) (17.9184) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4712*** 6.3540*** 62.9540*** 0.0269* 0.2500***
(0.0518) (0.9436) (17.8701) (0.0147) (0.0467)
0.4885*** 6.5931*** 67.1984*** 0.0212 0.2703***
(0.0518) (0.9466) (17.8947) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4903*** 6.5423*** 70.2569*** 0.0177 0.2862***
(0.0518) (0.9448) (17.9322) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4707*** 6.3435*** 67.3047*** 0.0156 0.2854***
(0.0518) (0.9458) (17.9444) (0.0145) (0.0469)
0.4805*** 6.6976*** 69.8575*** 0.0184 0.2771***
(0.0518) (0.9460) (17.9221) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4785*** 6.3559*** 66.0402*** 0.0179 0.2562***
(0.0518) (0.9438) (17.9086) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.5109*** 6.9246*** 71.2456*** 0.0261* 0.3020***
(0.0518) (0.9460) (17.9142) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4954*** 6.7201*** 69.2238*** 0.0228 0.3107***
(0.0518) (0.9459) (17.9171) (0.0151) (0.0469)
0.4709*** 6.4666*** 67.1620*** 0.0201 0.2669***
(0.0518) (0.9452) (17.8949) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4845*** 6.5196*** 66.7958*** 0.0181 0.2626***
(0.0518) (0.9438) (17.8859) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4918*** 6.8353*** 71.9419*** 0.0209 0.2569***
(0.0518) (0.9467) (17.9330) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4844*** 6.5763*** 65.5831*** 0.0217 0.2742***
(0.0518) (0.9451) (17.8906) (0.0146) (0.0469)
0.4935*** 6.7819*** 70.4994*** 0.0189 0.2945***
(0.0518) (0.9459) (17.9307) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4989*** 6.5988*** 68.3653*** 0.0183 0.2629***
(0.0518) (0.9445) (17.8998) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4856*** 6.5659*** 67.8823*** 0.0194 0.2930***
(0.0518) (0.9445) (17.8933) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4947*** 6.8316*** 68.8482*** 0.0210 0.2867***
(0.0518) (0.9462) (17.8954) (0.0146) (0.0469)
0.5065*** 6.7300*** 67.7379*** 0.0197 0.2941***
(0.0518) (0.9466) (17.8865) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4811*** 6.6299*** 66.8286*** 0.0234 0.2799***
(0.0518) (0.9445) (17.8852) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4927*** 6.6332*** 68.2741*** 0.0236 0.2674***
(0.0518) (0.9457) (17.9126) (0.0151) (0.0468)
0.4948*** 6.6903*** 68.6244*** 0.0168 0.2743***
(0.0518) (0.9452) (17.9401) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4809*** 6.5452*** 66.6261*** 0.0216 0.2610***
(0.0518) (0.9466) (17.9107) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.5042*** 6.6334*** 67.2795*** 0.0214 0.2745***
(0.0518) (0.9445) (17.8919) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4872*** 6.6246*** 67.3870*** 0.0220 0.2553***
(0.0518) (0.9449) (17.8872) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.5042*** 6.9050*** 73.0950*** 0.0224 0.2713***
(0.0518) (0.9486) (18.7279) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.5068*** 6.9194*** 73.3227*** 0.0171 0.2772***
(0.0519) (0.9471) (17.9530) (0.0145) (0.0468)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 2.7676 26.8511 0.0141 0.3367
std dev (0.46) (6.05) (77.97) (0.12) (0.47)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, Frequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Appendix Table 1: Panel B1 All Treatments on All Outcomes, During Experiment
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, Frequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short 
Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long 
Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short 
Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long 
Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results
from a single regression of the LHS variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown) and no constant. Figure 1 ummarizes the
experimental design and shows message scripts. Outcome data from Sept 15-Dec 31, 2012.
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, No 
Subsequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, Frequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, No 
Subsequent Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, Frequent 
Messages
No Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Overdraft 
Account Used
Days with 
Overdraft 
Balance
Avg Overdraft 
Account 
Balance (TL)
Whether Auto 
Bill Pay 
Registered
Any Debit 
Card POS 
Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B2: With August 30th Message (Aug 30 Msg vs No Aug 30 Msg)
0.4713*** 6.7056*** 70.5159*** 0.0215 0.2811***
(0.0518) (0.9486) (17.9377) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.5067*** 6.7093*** 69.4927*** 0.0164 0.3024***
(0.0519) (0.9464) (17.9113) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.5174*** 6.7440*** 70.0354*** 0.0161 0.2534***
(0.0519) (0.9476) (17.9068) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4851*** 6.7489*** 69.5513*** 0.0241* 0.2888***
(0.0518) (0.9463) (17.9178) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4878*** 6.6154*** 67.5291*** 0.0177 0.2688***
(0.0518) (0.9451) (17.8818) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4906*** 6.8270*** 68.0957*** 0.0202 0.2955***
(0.0518) (0.9461) (17.8923) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4951*** 6.7728*** 71.7434*** 0.0190 0.2729***
(0.0518) (0.9459) (17.9420) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4941*** 6.5587*** 69.4398*** 0.0264* 0.2775***
(0.0518) (0.9464) (17.9078) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4888*** 6.6508*** 68.6421*** 0.0228 0.2864***
(0.0518) (0.9446) (17.8896) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4844*** 6.9799*** 74.5776*** 0.0208 0.2766***
(0.0518) (0.9474) (18.0103) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4801*** 6.6898*** 68.7595*** 0.0182 0.2564***
(0.0518) (0.9458) (17.8931) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4848*** 6.6531*** 68.1416*** 0.0210 0.2769***
(0.0518) (0.9455) (17.9078) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4930*** 6.7532*** 69.4921*** 0.0214 0.2699***
(0.0518) (0.9460) (17.9111) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4619*** 6.5286*** 68.7370*** 0.0231 0.2811***
(0.0517) (0.9452) (17.9526) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4892*** 6.5927*** 69.7326*** 0.0212 0.2875***
(0.0518) (0.9451) (17.9266) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4856*** 6.7400*** 70.6072*** 0.0169 0.2809***
(0.0518) (0.9466) (17.9675) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4842*** 6.5841*** 70.4350*** 0.0237 0.2816***
(0.0518) (0.9453) (18.0066) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4529*** 6.6039*** 67.0223*** 0.0202 0.2761***
(0.0517) (0.9461) (17.9081) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4923*** 6.8243*** 70.5879*** 0.0283* 0.2728***
(0.0518) (0.9463) (17.8924) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4825*** 6.6793*** 66.2581*** 0.0209 0.2771***
(0.0518) (0.9478) (17.8944) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4788*** 6.6268*** 68.6067*** 0.0176 0.2618***
(0.0518) (0.9448) (17.9172) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4749*** 6.4210*** 67.6859*** 0.0244* 0.2737***
(0.0518) (0.9456) (17.9223) (0.0147) (0.0468)
0.4763*** 6.5968*** 69.2013*** 0.0203 0.2892***
(0.0518) (0.9461) (17.9395) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4950*** 6.6252*** 69.1369*** 0.0204 0.2551***
(0.0518) (0.9456) (17.9325) (0.0146) (0.0467)
0.4969*** 6.9319*** 71.2650*** 0.0195 0.2779***
(0.0518) (0.9477) (17.9804) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.5085*** 7.1027*** 71.1029*** 0.0182 0.3011***
(0.0519) (0.9475) (17.9161) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4989*** 6.5913*** 69.6550*** 0.0181 0.2694***
(0.0518) (0.9442) (17.9247) (0.0145) (0.0467)
0.4774*** 6.5156*** 69.3186*** 0.0202 0.2715***
(0.0518) (0.9473) (17.9188) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4892*** 6.6541*** 68.4450*** 0.0202 0.2679***
(0.0518) (0.9481) (17.9195) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.5090*** 6.8954*** 71.6639*** 0.0163 0.2922***
(0.0518) (0.9484) (17.9212) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4979*** 6.8676*** 70.7397*** 0.0204 0.2479***
(0.0519) (0.9465) (17.9044) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.5250*** 7.4001*** 72.3517*** 0.0196 0.2692***
(0.0519) (0.9501) (18.0052) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.4932*** 6.8690*** 69.3660*** 0.0149 0.2932***
(0.0518) (0.9463) (17.8975) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.4812*** 6.7144*** 67.3570*** 0.0162 0.2727***
(0.0518) (0.9458) (17.9064) (0.0145) (0.0468)
0.5041*** 6.7186*** 69.2527*** 0.0197 0.2782***
(0.0518) (0.9469) (17.9193) (0.0146) (0.0468)
0.5065*** 6.8686*** 72.1015*** 0.0246* 0.2579***
(0.0519) (0.9470) (17.9629) (0.0147) (0.0467)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 2.7676 26.8511 0.0141 0.3367
std dev (0.46) (6.05) (77.97) (0.12) (0.47)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Appendix Table 1: Panel B2 All Treatments on All Outcomes, During Experiment
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long 
Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short 
Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Short 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long 
Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Auto-Debit Discount, Long 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short 
Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Short 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long 
Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Interest Discount + Debit Card Discount, Long 
Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Auto-Debit Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Frequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Short Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, No Subsequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results
from a single regression of the LHS variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown) and no constant. Figure 1 ummarizes the
experimental design and shows message scripts. Outcome data from Sept 15-Dec 31, 2012.
Aug 30 Mess, Debit Card Discount, Long Duration, Infrequent Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, Frequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Short Duration, Infrequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, No Subsequent 
Messages
Aug 30 Mess, Overdraft Availabilty Reminder, Long Duration, Frequent 
Messages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
August 30 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (1) 1.0552** 1.0554** 0.7883** 0.7884** 0.4584 0.4584 0.8782** 0.8784** 0.7521** 0.7519**
       Omitted category for (1): No August 30 Message (0.4701) (0.4701) (0.3757) (0.3757) (0.3279) (0.3279) (0.4128) (0.4128) (0.3788) (0.3788)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount (2) -0.1057 -0.3302 -0.7058** -0.2134 -0.3530
       Omitted cat for (2): No Overdraft Interest Discount (0.4688) (0.3753) (0.3276) (0.4122) (0.3786)
0.6179 0.5033 0.0841 0.6351 0.5577
(0.6887) (0.5664) (0.4924) (0.6235) (0.5744)
       Omitted category: No Overdraft Interest Discount
-0.1347 -0.3622 -0.5305 -0.2595 -0.5291
(0.6988) (0.5613) (0.4899) (0.6187) (0.5644)
0.1573 -0.3294 -0.7268 -0.2582 -0.3564
(0.7236) (0.5619) (0.4872) (0.6173) (0.5677)
0.9562 0.8008 0.9421* 0.7563 0.7301
(0.7029) (0.5629) (0.4961) (0.6150) (0.5657)
Omitted category for (3)-(6): No Mention of Overdraft
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (6) 0.6765 0.6496 0.1341 0.8661 0.7943
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.3519 0.1856 0.2787 0.2153 0.0999
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (5) 0.5782 0.2029 0.1512 0.2151 0.1681
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (4) & (6) 0.1831 0.0737 0.0098 0.1549 0.0536
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.3414 0.0824 0.0033 0.1546 0.0973
Mean of Dependent Variable 26.8511 26.8511 24.9654 24.9654 21.7815 21.7815 26.0092 26.0092 24.4586 24.4586
std dev (77.97) (77.97) (62.22) (62.22) (53.83) (53.83) (68.47) (68.47) (62.61) (62.61)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 106,920 106,920 108,000 108,000 107,668 107,668
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (6) 
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; No Other 
Discount (3)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Auto-
Debit Discount (4)
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors.1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results from a single regression of the dependent variable (column
header) on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. All variables cover the time period September 15-December 31,
2012.
Appendix Table 2. Effects of First Two Overdraft Messages on Overdraft Balances (Outlier Robustness Checks), During Experiment
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (top 1% dropped)
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (top 1% of positive 
values winsorized)
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (top 1% of 
positive values dropped)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Debit 
Card Discount (5)
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (TL)
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (top 1% winsorized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
August 30 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (1) -8.8772 -8.8742 -8.5695* -8.5665* -7.3427* -7.3425* -0.0118 -0.0118
       Omitted category for (1): No August 30 Message (9.7693) (9.7695) (4.9101) (4.9100) (3.7965) (3.7965) (0.0115) (0.0115)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount (2) 9.0521 4.7638 4.6077 0.0054
       Omitted cat for (2): No Overdraft Interest Discount (9.7355) (4.9104) (3.7965) (0.0115)
20.7432 14.9608** 11.9637** 0.0155
(15.0104) (7.5158) (5.8106) (0.0173)
16.2004 9.7244 4.6246 -0.0035
(15.1406) (7.4376) (5.6585) (0.0172)
-13.3622 -7.7783 1.1798 -0.0040
(14.3609) (7.1361) (5.6016) (0.0171)
-3.5934 2.5969 3.9228 -0.0082
(13.9766) (7.3736) (5.7159) (0.0171)
Omitted category for (3)-(6): No Mention of Overdraft
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (6) 0.1193 0.1532 0.2322 0.2337
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.7855 0.5479 0.2721 0.3411
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (5) 0.0329 0.0072 0.1042 0.3263
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (4) & (6) 0.2079 0.4067 0.9153 0.8147
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.5146 0.2130 0.6754 0.8321
Mean of Dependent Variable 415.3350 415.3350 359.4495 359.4495 305.0098 305.0098 4.2853 4.2853
std dev (1631.25) (1631.25) (847.06) (847.06) (654.51) (654.51) (2.11) (2.11)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 106,920 106,920 106,020 106,020
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Auto-
Debit Discount (4)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Debit 
Card Discount (5)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (6) 
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results from a single
regression of the dependent variable (column header) on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental
design and shows message scripts. All variables cover the time period September 15-December 31.
Appendix Table 3. Effects on Checking + Savings Balances, During Experiment
Avg Monthly Deposit 
Assets
Avg Monthly Deposit 
Assets (top 1% 
winsorized)
Avg Monthly Deposit 
Assets (top 1% dropped)
Avg Monthly Deposit 
Assets (Log)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; No Other 
Discount (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.0070 -0.0070 0.1889 0.1880 2.3233 2.3214
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.1214) (0.1214) (1.7323) (1.7326)
0.0008 0.0008 0.0469 0.0470 0.6031 0.6041
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.4217) (0.4217)
-0.0078 -0.0013 -0.0939 -0.0084 0.8178 1.0118
(0.0072) (0.0081) (0.1214) (0.1360) (1.7290) (1.9370)
-0.0057** -0.0039 -0.0615* -0.0311 -0.2284 0.0665
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0342) (0.0381) (0.4191) (0.4599)
0.0193* 0.2532 0.5743
(0.0107) (0.1807) (2.5329)
0.0055 0.0914* 0.8857
(0.0044) (0.0521) (0.6385)
0.3287*** 0.3241*** 4.0805*** 4.0258*** 40.7065*** 40.8089***
(0.0067) (0.0078) (0.1085) (0.1259) (1.5001) (1.7283)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (1) & (2) 0.3164 0.3122 0.2606 0.2637 0.3345 0.3354
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (3) & (4) 0.7853 0.7678 0.7971 0.8723 0.5561 0.6347
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (5) & (6) 0.2332 0.3895 0.9051
Mean(LHS) Sept-Nov 0.3077 0.3077 2.7676 2.7676 26.8511 26.8511
std dev (0.46) (0.46) (6.05) (6.05) (77.97) (77.97)
Omitted Category: 
No Overdraft 
Discount
No Mention of 
Overdraft
No Overdraft 
Discount
No Mention of 
Overdraft
No Overdraft 
Discount
No Mention of 
Overdraft
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Appendix Table 4. Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Prior Use? 
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (No 
Incentive) * No Prior Overdraft Acct Use (6)
Used Overdraft Account in Six Months Before Treatment (7)
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents results
from a single regression of the LHS variable on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1 summarizes the experimental
design and shows message scripts. Overdraft outcomes cover Sept 15-Dec 31, 2012. Overdraft prior use indicates the 17% of the sample that overdrafted at least
once during Feb-Aug 2012.
Overdraft Account Used Days with Overdraft Balance
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (TL)
August 30 Overdraft Availability Reminder * Prior Overdraft 
Acct Use (1)
August 30 Overdraft Availability Reminder * No Prior 
Overdraft Acct Use (2)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount * Prior 
Overdraft Acct Use (3)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount * No Prior 
Overdraft Acct Use (4)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (No 
Incentive) * Prior Overdraft Acct Use (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0016 -0.0001 0.0943* 0.0476 1.0338 1.1444
(0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0518) (0.0631) (0.6541) (0.7875)
-0.0075* -0.0802 -0.0842
(0.0040) (0.0522) (0.6774)
-0.0055 -0.0653 -0.1271
(0.0040) (0.0509) (0.6488)
0.0032 0.0203 -0.2016
(0.0060) (0.0778) (0.9581)
0.0008 0.0731 1.4372
(0.0060) (0.0778) (0.9865)
-0.0021 0.0127 0.8122
(0.0059) (0.0785) (1.0244)
-0.0076 -0.1253* -1.0793
(0.0059) (0.0754) (0.9514)
-0.0121** -0.0713 -0.0710
(0.0059) (0.0773) (1.0665)
-0.0034 -0.0812 0.3861
(0.0059) (0.0757) (0.9770)
0.0114* 0.2021** 0.7912
(0.0060) (0.0797) (1.0046)
0.0063 0.0622 1.1212
(0.0060) (0.0767) (0.9815)
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (2) & (3) 0.7291 0.8383 0.9635
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (4) & (5) 0.7720 0.6313 0.2327
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (6) & (7) 0.5111 0.2049 0.1762
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (8) & (9) 0.2982 0.9267 0.7518
p-value on F-test of equality between rows (10) & (11) 0.5477 0.2058 0.8140
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.3077 0.3077 2.7676 2.7676 26.8511 26.8511
std dev (0.46) (0.46) (6.05) (6.05) (77.97) (77.97)
Observations 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000 108,000
Appendix Table 5. Does the August 30 Message Mediate Treatment Effects of Later Messages?
Notes: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors. 1.0TL = $.56. Unit of observation is the unit of randomization: the account-holder. Each column presents
results from a single regression of the dependent variable (column header) on the treatment variables shown and the randomization strata (not shown). Figure 1
summarizes the experimental design and shows message scripts. Overdraft outcomes cover September 15-December 31, 2012.
August 30 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder (1)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder w/ 
Aug 30 Msg (10)
Overdraft Account Used Days with Overdraft Balance
Avg Overdraft Account 
Balance (TL)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount w/ Aug 
30 Msg (2)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount w/o Aug 
30 Msg (3)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Debit 
Card Discount w/o Aug 30 Msg (9)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Availability Reminder w/o 
Aug 30 Msg (11)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; No 
Other Discount w/ Aug 30 Msg (4)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; No 
Other Discount w/o Aug 30 Msg (5)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Auto 
Debit Discount w/ Aug 30 Msg (6)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Auto 
Debit Discount w/o Aug 30 Msg (7)
September 15 Message: Overdraft Interest Discount; Debit 
Card Discount w/ Aug 30 Msg (8)
